

One of the most famous philosophical texts of the second half of the twentieth century is Thomas Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" This paper, which argues against materialistic reductionism in philosophy of mind, is almost as equally famous for Nagel's arguments as for its title. So, we can ask ourselves what it is like to be any other consciousness agent – on the basis of the subjectivity of *what it is like* Nagel argues that the subjective experience of another being capable of having an experience is unreachable for us. We can imagine what it is like to be a bat, but we cannot have a bat's experience. When I reached for the book titled *Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change?* one of the first questions that crossed my mind was exactly *what is it like to be ... but this time ... a woman* (in philosophy)? Oh, I know the answer to this question, and that is not unreachable for me; so why did I continue reading this book and why did I write a review? The answer is very simple: because this question has objective social and structural causes and sources in modern societies and philosophical institutions, which go beyond my conscious experience.

Why do we still need such a book in which questions about women's positions in academic philosophy are raised after all the feministic activities and fights for equality with men during the last century? When we look at the data presented in this book ("Appendix 1", pp. 231–252; "Appendix 2", pp. 253–259), the reason is obvious. Statistically, the position of women in academic philosophy in the last quarter of the twentieth century didn't change significantly, while theoretical philosophy dwelling on the question of gender equality and representation obdurately resists any substantial progress in the last twenty or thirty years ago, not unlike mathematics, physics, or technical disciplines.

This book raises two central questions on the basis of these statistical data and of individual experiences of women involved in academic philosophy: what is/are the reason(s) for this state of affairs, and, accordingly, what needs to be changed? The data about women's representation and influence collected and presented in this book reflects the state of philosophy in universities across the Anglophone part of the world (Australia, USA, Canada, Great Britain). Statistical data about the academic position of women in the continental philosophical tradition, or geographically in Europe, are not presented in the book. It would be very interesting to see what the status of women in philosophy is in this part of Europe, in which even the very word "philosophy" carries with itself a pejorative connotation.

When we try to summarize the problem of women's position in academic philosophy, we can approach this problem from at least two points of view: a) personal, and b) institutional. If we translate this bifurcation into sociological terms, we can analyze women's position in academic philosophy at the micro level, i.e. in a face-to-face interaction with male colleagues, and at the macro level, i.e. within institutional statistics. Nevertheless, both aspects have to be taken into consideration for a complete analysis, and indeed the both aspects are presented and analyzed in the book.

The initial impetus of this book was the symposium at the Australian National University in 2009: the book is a collection of eleven texts that discuss several aspects of women's position in philosophy, starting from the question "Why should we care?", to some structural problems of philosophy, such as the problem of method, stereotypes, implicit bias, merit in academic meritocracy, pipeline problem, micro-inequities etc. As I mentioned before, all of these questions can be approached at the structural level and at the level of a direct social interaction. The first dominant explanation of the subordination of women in the world of academic philosophy is based on the specific understanding of Western philosophy as a discipline that has grown on conceptual oppositions like reason/emotion, mind/body, culture/nature, on the one side, and on the negative connotation ascribed to women and to characteristics they possess (emotion, lack of rationality, female defectiveness etc.), on the other side. Meanwhile this explanation has lost some of its vigor because the majority of the arguments supporting it belongs to the history of philosophy, which does not play an important role in the contemporary analytic philosophy. A further explanation is offered by Marilyn Friedman ("Women in Philosophy: Why Should We Care?", pp. 21–38): she discusses the method that is used in academic philosophical argumentation, the path from a general philosophical education (discussions group, lectures) to the level of academic discussion on philosophical problems. Her argument is that this standard philosophical procedure as it is conducted in the majority of universities is not appropriate to women. Adversarial method used in all these activities is aggressive and this may explain the disproportion in the academic achievement between men and women. Besides traditional prejudices toward women in philosophy, the underrated position of women in this discipline is owed to an implicit bias and stereotype. Those two concepts in combination with the traditional cultural view of women as creatures of emotion rather than of reason secure a better explanation of why it is more difficult for women to succeed in academic philosophy. It implies a problem within the system of promotion in academic philosophy and opportunity for publication of papers in top rated journals. Thus, Fiona Jenkins ("Singing the Post-discrimination Blues: Notes for a Critique of Academic Meritocracy",

pp. 81–102) questions the meritocratic standards in philosophy based on hyper-rationality and blindness of excellence.

Analyses presented in this book suggest several levels of problems encountered by women in philosophy. But at the end the question why it is important to put questions like these remains open. Why should we care about women in philosophy? A possible answer offered in the book is that it is because philosophers traditionally should care about fairness and justice. A further answer lurking beneath the surface of the book suggest that a methodological and thematic diversity can be stimulating for philosophy itself.

This book is an interesting combination of philosophical discourse combined with the gender studies, sociological and socio-psychological analyses by which we gain an insight into the morally ambiguous state of philosophy torn between the declared rationality and everyday academic philosophical life which is often not based on rational behaviour. This book also provides a very inspiring framework for rethinking the self-image that philosophers have about their discipline. It also provides some suggestions as to what needs to be changed if philosophy cares to become a discipline more hospitable to women and more able to benefit from the contribution of women.

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Ingmar Persson, Julian Savulescu, *Unfit For the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 143 pp.

Tema je ove knjige raskorak između ljudskog moralnog i znanstveno-tehnološkog razvoja te ona upozorava na opasnosti koje prijete opstanku ljudske vrste u modernom svijetu ako se u što skorijem roku ne razviju učinkovite metode poboljšanja naših moralnih kapaciteta. Rasprava o moralnom poboljšanju ljudske vrste jedna je od aktualnijih unutar suvremene primijenjene etike. Među najistaknutijim zagovornicima moralnog (biomedicinskog) poboljšanja nalaze se upravo autori ove knjige: Ingmar Persson i Julian Savulescu iz Centra za praktičnu etiku Oxford Uehiro. Knjiga predstavlja rezultat njihova višegodišnjeg bavljenja moralnim poboljšanjem, a prije nje su – što